Two former business associates, Scott Dylan and David Antrobus, have been disqualified from running companies for a combined 23 years after more than £13.9m moved through two firms using unarranged Barclays overdrafts. The Insolvency Service said the pair’s conduct triggered account freezes, contempt of court findings and a trail of insolvencies totalling over £52m. For investors and SMEs, this is a stark example of how weak controls around banking facilities can spiral into legal and financial damage.

At the High Court in London on Thursday 4 December 2025, Dylan, 41, received a 13‑year ban and Antrobus, 39, a 10‑year ban. Both orders take effect on 25 December 2025 and prohibit them from forming, managing or promoting a company without court permission. The judge described Dylan as the “driving force” behind the activity.

According to the Insolvency Service, Antrobus signed bank applications in March and April 2021 naming Dylan as primary contact for Oldcoft Ltd and Old3 Ltd, then known as FT (OPS) Limited and Fresh Thinking Group Limited. Three accounts were opened in April and May 2021: sterling current accounts for both companies and a euro account for Oldcoft.

Between mid‑July and late September 2021, more than £13.9m was transferred into Oldcoft’s current account from ten connected companies. The flows were funded by unarranged overdrafts - facilities that allow payments to clear despite insufficient funds, but which can be withdrawn at any time with immediate repayment demanded.

Outflows followed quickly. Over the same period, more than £11.7m left Oldcoft’s current account. Dylan personally received £1.675m. Over £7.4m was sent to Old3’s account and at least £1.545m went to other connected entities. In August 2021, Oldcoft’s euro account was pushed into an unarranged overdraft to make 37 transfers totalling €1.795m to a family member. Liquidators later reported finding no evidence to support Dylan’s claim the money funded a hotel purchase in Turkey.

Barclays obtained freezing injunctions on 24 September 2021 and sought explanations for the transfers, then demanded repayment within two weeks. The court later heard there was “no legitimate purpose” for removing the funds and that the conduct was “little short of a scam”. Those are withering assessments that underline how quickly banks and judges will act when account activity looks irregular.

The wider group then began to unravel. In November 2021 the ten connected companies entered provisional liquidation. Oldcoft was wound up in January 2022 owing an estimated £44m, including £13.7m to Barclays. Old3 went into administration in April 2022 with an estimated deficiency of £8.2m. On any view, creditors across the network were left with material shortfalls, disrupting suppliers and dependent firms.

Compliance failings compounded the losses. Both men breached the freezing orders by transferring an entire group of companies to two British Virgin Islands entities without informing Barclays. In October 2024 the court sentenced Dylan to 22 months in prison for contempt; Antrobus received the same term in his absence and a committal warrant was issued.

There was relevant history too. Dylan had already given an undertaking to the court in September 2019 while separate disqualification proceedings were ongoing over SDRW Limited. Those proceedings concluded in September 2025, with an eight‑year ban after he acted as a director while bankrupt between July 2013 and July 2015. Antrobus, who failed to maintain and deliver Oldcoft’s accounting records to the liquidator, was declared bankrupt in August 2025.

For SMEs, the banking lesson is clear. Unarranged overdrafts are not breathing room; they are callable exposure. If a bank questions activity, it can freeze accounts and demand immediate repayment, locking up working capital and payroll. That risk multiplies where intercompany transfers blur purpose and documentation is thin.

Good governance would have looked very different: clear board approval for major transfers, documented rationale, timely accounting records, strict control over related‑party payments and early legal advice the moment a freezing order lands. We often see in enforcement cases that it is the combination of weak records and defiance of court orders that turns a liquidity problem into a legal crisis.

For investors and creditors, simple checks can help spot trouble early: sudden name changes, heavy reliance on uncommitted banking lines, unusual foreign‑currency transfers and frequent movements between connected parties. None of these signals proves wrongdoing on its own, but together they warrant questions. This case shows how quickly cash can move, how fast banks can react and how long the consequences can last.