MI5 has warned MPs, peers and parliamentary staff that Chinese state actors are approaching them via LinkedIn, prompting Security Minister Dan Jarvis to announce a £170m upgrade to government encryption and a wider counter‑interference plan. The focus, set out in the Commons on 18 November, is on stopping human‑led approaches before they become security breaches, BBC and Reuters reporting shows.

Parliament’s Speakers circulated an MI5 alert naming two LinkedIn profiles - Amanda Qiu of BR‑YR Executive Search and Shirly Shen of Internship Union - alleged to be acting for China’s Ministry of State Security by posing as recruiters. The alert says such accounts seek insider insights and cultivate contacts with offers of fees or trips, according to ITV News and the Guardian.

Jarvis told MPs the activity constitutes covert interference and said the government will close weak points across politics, business and academia. Measures include the £170m technology spend, removal of Chinese‑linked surveillance kit from sensitive sites, and tailored briefings for parties and candidates ahead of May 2026 devolved and local elections, as outlined by Reuters and ITV.

China rejects the claims. The Chinese embassy in London called the allegations “pure fabrication” and accused the UK of staging a charade that harms relations, a response captured in Reuters’ write‑up. Expect Beijing to contest any steps it views as political theatre.

For UK companies, the risk profile is familiar: a plausible request for paid briefings or a consultancy gig that drifts into asks for “non‑public context”. MI5’s note highlights that China has a low threshold for what counts as useful, piecing together small fragments to build a bigger picture, ITV reported.

That matters for compliance teams because political intelligence often overlaps with commercial confidentiality. A policy adviser sharing pre‑publication committee timetables, a supply‑chain manager outlining procurement shifts, or a researcher discussing trial data trends may believe they are offering general observations. Treat any paid request for political or economic “insider insights” as a high‑risk engagement that needs formal approval, documentation and conflict checks.

Universities and the research sector are firmly in scope. Jarvis said ministers will engage directly with university leaders, while MI5’s National Protective Security Authority guidance describes long‑term cultivation, exploitation of overseas travel and fundraising as recognised tactics. The message is simple: assume you are a target and report early.

On transparency rules, Conservative MP Alicia Kearns has pressed ministers to move China, or elements of its state apparatus, onto the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme. For now, the top tier covers only Iran and Russia, per Home Office guidance; the government says further designations are under review. ITV London has previously described Kearns’s brief as shadow national security minister.

The embassy row sits in the background. A decision on Beijing’s proposed “super‑embassy” at Royal Mint Court has slipped again, with China warning of consequences for further delay, the Financial Times reported. Tower Hamlets rejected earlier plans in 2024 before ministers called in the scheme; a final ruling is pending.

The latest alert also follows the September collapse of a case against two men accused of spying for China, which intensified debate over how Westminster communicates risk and due process in national security cases. Reuters notes prosecutors abandoned proceedings after evidence issues about proving threat status.

For investors and managers, the near‑term playbook is practical. Treat unsolicited LinkedIn approaches involving money, travel or privileged briefings as compliance events; record and escalate them. Update insider‑information policies to cover politically exposed information flows from Westminster and the devolved institutions. For universities and spin‑outs, map overseas funding lines, re‑check export‑control obligations on dual‑use research and involve legal early when foreign partners request data access.

Trade with China continues. Jarvis has stressed China remains a major UK trading partner, while saying sanctions will be used when necessary. For businesses, that means maintaining lawful commerce while hardening people‑based defences - training, approvals and audit trails - to withstand recruitment‑style approaches. BBC coverage of the Commons statement supports that balance.