Downing Street confirmed Prime Minister Keir Starmer met Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever on Friday 12 December. The readout was concise: priorities on migration, security and growth; Ukraine talks described as pivotal; and a shared line that sustained economic pressure on Russia is essential to a just peace.

Behind that language sits a live finance-policy question: how far and how fast Europe can use the value locked in immobilised Russian sovereign assets. On 12 December, EU ministers approved a measure that prohibits any transfer of Russia’s central bank reserves back to Moscow on a rolling basis under Article 122, effectively putting the estimated €210bn under a long‑term lock while leaders finalise the broader financing package.

Brussels has already put a mechanism in place for the money these assets earn while they are immobilised. In 2024 the Council agreed that the net windfall profits generated by EU central securities depositories holding Russian reserves would be channelled to Ukraine through EU instruments, with contributions accruing from 15 February 2024 and paid twice a year. That is the practical meaning behind London and Brussels talking about using the “value” of immobilised assets.

The numbers are material. Euroclear, which holds the bulk of these assets in Brussels, says it has paid around €5bn into the EU’s Ukraine fund by September 2025, while Belgium collected roughly €1.7bn in 2024 corporate tax on related interest income. That flow will fluctuate with rates, but it shows why Belgium wants watertight legal guarantees as EU leaders move toward an asset‑backed loan for Kyiv.

The G7 track matters too. Washington disbursed $20bn in December 2024 under the $50bn Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loans, to be repaid from the proceeds generated by immobilised Russian sovereign assets. The UK is part of that G7 framework, so any EU move to scale the model would sit alongside, not replace, allied financing.

There are legal risks to watch. Russia’s central bank has sued Euroclear in Moscow and warned of retaliation. EU officials counter that their approach respects sovereign immunity over the principal and relies on windfall proceeds and protective safeguards. For investors, we read this as policy that aims to minimise precedent risk while keeping funding flowing to Ukraine.

For UK markets, the UK‑Belgium angle is not just diplomacy. Belgium remains a significant trading partner: ONS data put total UK‑Belgium trade at about £60.7bn in 2024, with UK exports led by pharmaceuticals (£2.6bn in the four quarters to Q2 2025), gas (£1.7bn), cars (£1.4bn) and refined oil (£1.1bn). Exposure sits across manufacturers, energy traders and service firms.

Energy interconnection is a second-order read-through. The 1GW Nemo Link power cable between Kent and Bruges has run with high availability since 2019, offering price smoothing on tight system days. On gas, the bi‑directional Interconnector UK pipeline links Bacton to Zeebrugge with around 20 bcm export and 21.2 bcm import capacity, underpinning flexibility in winter.

The two leaders also agreed to deepen operational cooperation on illegal migration, including returns and readmissions, plus enhanced law‑enforcement collaboration. For businesses, this reads as process work rather than immediate changes to freight or customs. We’ll flag any concrete measures once operational guidance lands.

Near‑term milestones are clear. EU leaders are due to discuss the asset‑backed Ukraine package next week, with texts already moving via written procedure. UK investors should watch for the final EU legal design, any UK alignment signals, and Euroclear’s disclosures on contributions and litigation.