President Donald Trump said the US will impose a 10% tariff on goods from the UK, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Finland from 1 February 2026, rising to 25% on 1 June, unless Denmark agrees a US purchase of Greenland. Announced via Truth Social on Saturday 17 January, the move is framed by the White House as a national security measure tied to Arctic defence. AP News and the Washington Post report that the duties would apply to “any and all goods” until such a deal is reached. ([apnews.com](Link

Public reaction has been immediate. Thousands rallied in Copenhagen and Nuuk carrying signs such as “Hands off Greenland” and “Greenland is not for sale”. A bipartisan US congressional delegation led by Senator Chris Coons has been in Copenhagen attempting to cool tensions, saying the priority is to respect Greenlanders’ right to decide their future. Coverage from the Times and the Guardian also notes small European deployments to Greenland intended as a show of support for Denmark. ([thetimes.com](Link

For UK and EU exporters, this sits on top of the tariff regime introduced through 2025: a 10% ‘reciprocal’ baseline on most goods, a global 25% tariff on imported cars and parts, and higher duties on steel and aluminium under Section 232-though UK steel and aluminium have remained at 25% after a 2025 adjustment. Today’s step would lift the named countries to 25% on goods not already at that rate, unless politics intervenes. Source documents include the White House steel/aluminium proclamations and CBP guidance on reciprocal tariffs. ([whitehouse.gov](Link

Scale matters. According to the Office for National Statistics, the US bought £59.3bn of UK goods in 2024-16.2% of all UK goods exports-with machinery and transport equipment making up almost half of shipments. Services are not directly hit by goods tariffs; the US accounted for £137bn of UK services exports in 2024. ([ons.gov.uk](Link

Automotive exposure is already considerable. The US was the UK’s number one car export market in 2024 at £9.0bn-over a quarter of all UK car exports-while Washington imposed a 25% tariff on imported vehicles and many parts from April 2025. Today’s Greenland-linked action mainly drags the rest of the goods basket towards 25%, but it keeps the sector under sustained pricing pressure and could complicate US dealer allocations for UK-built premium models. Figures are from ONS and AP reporting on the auto tariff. ([ons.gov.uk](Link

Food and drink will feel the squeeze next. The Scotch Whisky Association says the US remains the industry’s largest market by value at around £971m in 2024. Moving from a 10% to a 25% US duty on named countries would significantly raise landed costs for importers of Scotch, Irish whiskey made in the EU, and UK craft spirits, with smaller brands least able to absorb the hit. ([scotch-whisky.org.uk](Link

Pharmaceuticals and life sciences-£6.6bn of UK medicinal and pharmaceutical exports to the US in 2024-face a difficult pricing conversation with distributors, even if patient demand is steady. Tariffs don’t change clinical need, but they do add friction to hospital and pharmacy procurement. ONS data shows medicines are a core pillar of the UK’s transatlantic goods trade. ([ons.gov.uk](Link

Machinery and scientific instruments-everything from power‑gen equipment to lab kit-accounted for £29.1bn of UK exports to the US in 2024. A broad rise to 25% would force many SMEs to either reprice or rework their US channel agreements, particularly where distributors typically pay duty at entry and then claw back margin. That’s a negotiation, not a formality. Figures from the ONS. ([ons.gov.uk](Link

Integrated European supply chains need to watch origin rules. US customs treats country of origin under the “substantial transformation” test: a UK component turned into a finished product in, say, Germany becomes EU origin for tariff purposes, and vice versa. That means the final assembly location-not where parts were made-often determines which country gets hit by the 25% rate. See 19 CFR 134 and US Commerce guidance. ([law.cornell.edu](Link

Timing is critical. US Customs and Border Protection assesses duty when goods are “entered for consumption”, not on the date they leave the UK or EU. In past rounds of tariffs, CBP allowed limited in‑transit exceptions, but the default is clear: if it arrives and clears after the effective date, duty is due. Exporters should check entry timing with their broker now. CBP’s published FAQs set out the rules. ([cbp.gov](Link

Policy risk doesn’t stop at the Atlantic. Brussels prepared €22–26bn in countermeasures during the 2025 tariff flare‑up before pausing to allow talks, a reminder that retaliation can broaden the product list and extend the dispute. If this Greenland‑linked action sticks, a coordinated EU response is likely to be discussed quickly; London has so far preferred dialogue first. Reporting from the Guardian and Euronews outlines the EU’s playbook. ([theguardian.com](Link

What to do now? UK and EU suppliers shipping to the US have a short window before 1 February to accelerate deliveries and about four months to plan for a potential 25% rate from 1 June. That means re‑quoting US customers, revisiting Incoterms, and pressure‑testing margin if duty is borne by the importer. None of this assumes escalation; it recognises what’s on the calendar. ([apnews.com](Link

The politics will keep moving. Protests in Denmark and Greenland are set against a diplomatic push by US lawmakers to “lower the temperature”, and European allies say Arctic security should remain a NATO responsibility. For exporters, the signal is straightforward-even if the story is not: plan for tariffs; hope for talks. Coverage from AP, the Washington Post and Foreign Policy tracks the diplomatic path. ([apnews.com](Link